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This article introduces cybersecurity in the discussion on security in the European High North 
in a redefined and refocused form. Instead of scrutinising the technical measures taken to 
protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in systems and networks 
(information security) or the criticality of a number of digitally operated infrastructures to the 
functioning of society (national cybersecurity), it concentrates on the human being. It 
examines cybersecurity from an individual’s perspective by asking what kind of personal 
security concerns people may have with regard to digitalisation and how those are or are not 
present in the discussion on health and social security re-organization in the Finnish Lapland. 
The theoretical foundation of this article rests within the human security framework. 
Individuals living their everyday lives in particular cyber-physical environments are taken as 
the referent object of security. In the digitalising European High North, multiple aspects of 
everyday security depend upon cybersecurity, including economic, environmental, and food 
securities. This article concentrates on health and social security. It examines linkages 
between the re-organization of health and social security in Finland and personal security 
concerns with a particular focus on the case of Länsi-Pohja area in south-western Lapland. 
The overall aim is to create room for bottom-up influence on the primarily top-down 
processes of security production in the cyber-physical environment. 
1. Introduction 
Digitisation1 and digitalisation2 emerged as state policies in the mid 1990’s in Finland. In the 
new millennium, these policies became geographically extensive and have been intensively 
driven by the governments. In 2008, for example, the Finnish government declared internet 
access as a fundamental right, which precipitated country-wide, state-supported broadband 
construction programmes with regional implementation. Similarly, national information 
security strategies were established in the early 2000’s. Cybersecurity as a national policy 
emerged in the early 2010’s. Development in Sweden and Norway has proceeded along 
similar lines. For example, all of the states have published national information society, 
digitalisation, information security and cybersecurity strategies from the 1990’s onwards. 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have penetrated the Nordic societies to 
such an extent that the nominator “cyber-physical” is used in the article to describe the 
everyday environment in which people live. A given starting point is that actions in the 
digital sphere affect the physical environment – and vice versa. 
In the European High North, that is, in the northernmost parts of Finland, Sweden and 
Norway3, digital development has followed the national timetables. Alongside climate 
                                                             
1 Conversion of analogical information into digital, binary format. S Brennen & D Kreiss, ‘Digitization and 
Digitalization’ (Culture Digitally 2014) <http://culturedigitally.org/2014/09/digitalization-and-digitization/> 
accessed 6.1.2018. 
2 Increasing use and dissemination of information and communication technologies in virtually all aspects of 
human life so that they begin to influence, shape and structure the environment. Ibid. 
3 Finland: Lapland; Sweden: Norrbotten; Norway: Troms, Finnmark and Nordland. 
 
 
change, digitalisation is the main contemporary driver of change in the region, even if 
infrastructural challenges exist. For instance, the region has been, and remains, the main 
beneficiary of country-wide network development programmes. Yet, it simultaneously serves 
as a test-bed for digital innovations and structural societal conversion. For example, Lapland 
has been a forerunner in digital education due to its sparse population, vast distances and 
general cost-efficiency pressures. Similarly, it has intensively developed digital health and 
social security services. The stated aim of the development has been to continue service 
provisioning close to people regardless of the continuous restructuring of national, regional 
and local administrations, which has centralised services to population centres. Prime 
concerns and opposition presented have related to increasing uncertainty and fears for 
reduced everyday security when service provisioning withers away from rural areas.4 
Individual security questions are at the heart of the on-going re-organization of health and 
social security in Finland. In this article, these concerns are presented through a case study in 
Lapland. The focus is on the political fight over future service provisioning in Länsi-Pohja, 
which is an area consisting of two towns and four municipalities in south-western Lapland. In 
governmental plans, this area would lose some of its services for the aim is to reduce regional 
duplication. Service provisioning would continue in Rovaniemi, the regional capital of 
Lapland, which is located around 100 kilometres away. Enhanced digitisation has been one of 
the envisioned substitutive policies to ensure that people will still have an easy service 
access. However, residents, town and municipality leaders, as well as health and social 
security professionals working in the area, resist the relocation plans. This confrontation has 
led to a political dispute within Länsi-Pohja, within Lapland, within political parties, as well 
as between local and national administrations. The case study has been chosen for it brings 
forth tensions embedded in the on-going restructuring of health and social security in Finland. 
It also well depicts the related security concerns that incentivise people to act upon the 
matter. 
Cybersecurity has rarely been addressed in the framework of human security.5 However, 
aspects related to human vulnerability in the turmoil of digitalisation have been discussed in 
science, technology and society literature6 and theorising on digital divides7. Cybersecurity 
literature, on the other hand, does not interrogate human security but, at its best, highlights 
the importance of teaching and training people to use ICTs in a smart manner. The object to 
be secured is “digital opportunities”, but the mainstream literature discusses merely the 
                                                             
4 For further information see M Salminen & K Hossain, ‘Digitalization and Human Security Dimensions in 
Cybersecurity: an Appraisal for the European High North’ (forthcoming). 
5 For example, the overview of human security theorising given by D Gasper & OA Gomez, ‘Evolution of 
Thinking and Research on Human and Personal Security 1994-2013’ (UNDP Human Development Report 
Office 2014) Occasional paper. <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/gomez_hdr14.pdf> accessed 3.11.2017. 
6 For example, G Yansen & M Zukerfeld, ‘Why Don’t Women Program? Exploring Links between Gender, 
Technology and Software’ (2014) 19 Science, Technology & Society (3) 305; P Cockshott & K Renaud, 
‘Humans, robots and values’ (2016) 45 Technology in Society 19; H Kukka and others, ‘From cyberpunk to 
calm urban computing: Exploring the role of technology in the future cityscape’ (2013) 84 Technological 
Forecasting & Social Change 29. 
7 For example, S Taipale, ‘The use of e-government services and the Internet: The role of socio-demographic, 
economic and geographical predictors’ (2012) 37 Telecommunications Policy (4-5) 413; P Räsänen, ‘The 
Persistence of Information Structures in Nordic Countries’ (2008) 24 The Information Society (4) 219; DP 
Subramony, ‘Understanding the Complex Dimensions of the Digital Divide: Lessons Learned in the Alaskan 
Arctic’ (2007) 76 The Journal of Negro Education (1) 57; B Warf, ‘Contours, contrasts, and contradictions of 
the Arctic internet’ (2011) 34 Polar Geography (3) 193. 
 
 
opportunities for states, businesses and/or other organizations while often bypassing people. 
In contradiction, information society and digitalisation literatures address the opportunities 
for people as well, but remain fairly silent about security. Therefore, there is a demand for 
bringing digitalisation and cybersecurity agendas together – not only for more holistic and 
extensive knowledge production, but also for improved policies that take human security 
questions related to digitalisation seriously. 
In this article, I will first briefly address the prevailing understanding of cybersecurity as both 
a technical and a national security question. In the second section, I will scrutinise how 
refocusing cybersecurity around the human being changes the prevailing understanding and 
calls for redefined cybersecurity. The third, and the main, section of the article discusses 
individuals’ security concerns related to the restructuring of health and social security in 
Lapland. As a conclusion, a more inclusive digital framework for the European High North is 
needed in order to address the existing security concerns. 
2. Prevailing Understanding of Cybersecurity 
The mainstream understanding of cybersecurity has developed together with information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) becoming ever more important for running and steering 
society and economy.8 It brings together responses to the vulnerability of ICTs and national 
security concerns. Technology-focused information security9 approach highlights the 
protection of information in systems and networks through technical, organizational and 
educational measures. It aims at safeguarding the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information in all situations.10 It also lays on the background of cybersecurity approach.11 
Cybersecurity lifts information security to another level by concentrating on the protection of 
infrastructures that enable the functioning of society. Technical vulnerabilities are inherent in 
these infrastructures hence opening a door for disruptions in their operations. The causes of 
disruptions may be accidental (for technical or environmental reasons) or intended (as 
malefactors seek to abuse the vulnerabilities). Moreover, the human being – who is still using 
ICTs or in charge of overseeing the (semi-)automated ICT operations – has been recognised 
as a major vulnerability, mainly due to his or her gullibility or vengefulness.12 Regardless of 
the cause of disruption, the main aim in cybersecurity is to ensure the functioning of 
                                                             
8 For example, M Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment? (Polity Press 2017) 12. 
9 In this article, information security is used as an umbrella term encompassing also computer security/hygiene 
and network security. The non-ICT-related aspects of information security, like professional confidentiality and 
storing of sensitive documents in strongboxes, are not considered. 
10 For example, N Gcaza and others, ‘A general morphological analysis: delineating a cyber-security culture’ 
(2017) 25 Information & Computer Security (3) 259; S DeKay & K Belva, ‘Privacy Roles and Responsibilities’ 
in CW Axelrod, JL Bayuk & D Schutzer (eds) Enterprise Information Security and Privacy (Artech House 
2009) 8-9; JR Vacca, ‘Introduction’ in JR Vacca (ed) Managing Information Security (2nd edn, Elsevier 2014) 
xix-xx. 
11 RD Alexander & S Panguluri, ‘Cybersecurity Terminology and Frameworks’ in RM Clark & S Hakim (eds) 
Cyber-Physical Security. Protecting Critical Infrastructure at the State and Local Level (Springer 2017) 22-24; 
N Ben-Asher & C Gonzalez, ‘Effects of cyber security knowledge on attack detection’ (2015) 48 Computers in 
Human Behavior 51; Gcaza and others (n 10). 
12 For example, AF Ginter, ‘Cyber Perimeters for Critical Infrastructures’ in RM Clark & S Hakim (eds) Cyber-
Physical Security. Protecting Critical Infrastructure at the State and Local Level (Springer 2017) 72; SJ White, 
‘Assessing Cyber Threats and Solutions for Municipalities’ in RM Clark & S Hakim (eds) Cyber-Physical 
Security. Protecting Critical Infrastructure at the State and Local Level (Springer 2017) 54-55; M Hall, ‘Why 
people are key to cyber-security’ [2016] Network Security (6) 9. 
 
 
infrastructures deemed critical for the functioning of society and economy in all situations. 
As majority of these infrastructures run on or are steered through ICTs, cybersecurity is a 
society-wide concern. Therefore, comprehensive national and supranational cybersecurity 
strategies have been developed to ensure societal (and organizational) resilience against 
cybersecurity incidents.13 
It is argued here that in all its comprehensiveness, the prevailing, systemic understanding of 
cybersecurity allocates inadequate attention to the human being.14 When concentrating on the 
protection of information and infrastructures, it bypasses the interests, needs and fears of 
people experiencing the consequences of omnipresent digitalisation. Trustworthiness and 
concealability of information, as well as the functioning or non-functioning of infrastructures, 
become meaningful only when people start experiencing the consequences of successful 
and/or failed protection in their everyday life. Inspired by the human security line of 
argumentation, this article brings the individual to the heart of cybersecurity and scrutinises 
the implications this move has, firstly, for the prevailing cybersecurity understanding and, 
secondly, for everyday life in the European High North. 
3. Cybersecurity from an Individual Security Point of View 
Human security strives both to examine the factors that cause insecurity to individuals and 
communities and to improve the situation. It is a critical, situational approach shedding light 
on the consequences of top-down decision-making in the experienced circumstances and 
enabling bottom-up influence in the decisions.15 In the European High North, this means 
scrutinising the implications – both positive and negative – that politically, economically and 
technologically driven digitalisation has in people’s everyday life and empowering 
individuals to influence the future trajectories of their cyber-physical environment. For 
society-wide digitalisation and cybersecurity strategies and programmes are decided upon in 
state capitals, they fail to accommodate the particularities of digital development in the 
regions. The cyber-physical environment becomes easily understood as a unified entity even 
if, for instance, geographical and infrastructural settings can vary greatly within a country. In 
addition, internet (over which a great deal of communication is carried out) is by definition a 
network of networks which vary, for instance, in terms of their robustness, security and 
resilience.16 These variations impact, for example, how good internet and/or cellular 
connections are, who is covering the costs of digital development and what kind of products 
and/or services are required. Besides material factors, people’s skills, awareness and 
confidence to act in the cyber-physical environment vary. 
                                                             
13 Also, for example, E Matani, L Yoffe & M Mashkautsan, ‘A Three-Layer Framework for a Comprehensive 
National Cybersecurity Strategy’ (2016) 17 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (3) 77. 
14 Similar claims have been made, for example, by M Dunn Cavelty, ‘Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: 
Aligning Security Needs and Removing Vulnerabilities’ (2014) 20 Science and Engineering Ethics (3) 701; 
Gcaza and others (n 10). 
15 M Glasius & M Kaldor, ‘A human security vision for Europe and beyond’ in M Glasius & M Kaldor (eds) A 
Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles, Practicalities (Routledge 2005) 3-19; United Nations 
Human Security Unit, ‘Human Security in Theory and Practice. An Overview of the Human Security Concept 
and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security’ <www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org. 
humansecurity/files/human_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdf> accessed 20.1.2018. 
16 Mueller (n 8) 15-17. 
 
 
Currently, an acknowledged gap in cybersecurity awareness and ICT-skills exists around the 
world.17 In this regard, the European High North is not an exception. Projects run throughout 
the region have strived to familiarise people with existing digital opportunities and/or risks 
and to improve their skills. 18 Similarly, state and/or EU-supported projects attempt to bring 
fast and reliable digital networks within everyone’s reach19 and to dismantle obstacles to 
digital access, for instance, for individuals of old age and/or with disabilities20. These 
projects, however, come with goals stated by the funder or initiator without much local 
influence on the agenda.21 Contrarily, the efforts of regional councils (funnelling state, EU or 
other funders’ resources) and local municipalities at least state that local people, 
communities, businesses and administration have been consulted in the processes of 
digitalisation programme formulation.22 
The state of information infrastructure in the European High North varies greatly23, but in 
general connectivity is fairly good. Where there is no fixed broadband, mobile networks 
enable both calling and data transfer. Connections are best in towns and along the main roads, 
whereas no reception may be available in the wilderness. Most of the region falls somewhere 
in between these two extremes. Zero reception is a concern, for example, for search and 
rescue – especially, when the number of tourists visiting the region keeps rising. In addition, 
some of the villages are dependent on only one fibre-optic cable. Ever increasing 
digitalisation, improving ICTs, and further digitisation of services set constant pressure for 
bandwidth availability and demand for infrastructure updates. In some areas, overlaps in 
frequencies forestall updates24, but in general the cycle of renewals is the same throughout 
                                                             
17 For example, Special Eurobarometer 464a ‘Europeans’ attitudes towards cyber security’ <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2171> 
accessed 1.12.2017; Special Eurobarometer 460 ‘Attitudes towards the impact of digitization and automation on 
daily life’ <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/ 
SPECIAL/surveyKy/2160> accessed 1.12.2017. 
18 For example, the DigimpiLappi -project <www.digimpilappi.com/> which targeted people over 55 years of 
age, for instance, through peer support (Digi Emissaries, who voluntarily help people to use digital services) and 
guidance (both online and face-to-face). 
19 For example, the Fast Broadband -project in Finland <www.viestintavirasto.fi/ohjausjavalvonta/ 
nopealaajakaista.html> which has been running under different names since 2008. Areas where the construction 
of high-speed broadband network is not beneficial under market terms can apply for state support under certain 
conditions. 
20 For example, the accessibility programmes run by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications 
since the early 2000’s. The first implementation programme was published in 2005. <www.lvm.fi/documents/ 
20181/817515/Kohti+esteetonta+viestintaa.+Toimenpideohjelma/88703178-f7af-4fbb-9d40fc96d7fe80d6? 
version=1.0> accessed 18.7.2016. These programmes are still running and regularly updated. 
21 For example, the Regional Council of Lapland has given such criticism. Lapin liitto, ’Lapin Digiohjelma 
2020’ (2013) 36 <www.lappi.fi/lapinliitto/c/document_library/get_file?folderId= 1457612&name=DLFE-
21300.pdf> accessed 28.7.2016; J Tiihonen, ’Lapin liitto: Vastuukuntamalli ei toimi Lapissa’ YLE (17.3.2014) 
<https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-7140029> accessed 19.12.2017. 
22 Lapin liitto (n 21); IT-Norrbotten, ‘Digital Agenda Norrbotten’ (2014) <www.itnorrbotten.se/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/11/digital_agenda_norrbotten.pdf> accessed 23.11.2016. 
23 See the coverage maps available on the Fast Broadband -project’s website <www.viestintavirasto.fi/ 
ohjausjavalvonta/nopealaajakaista/hankkeeneteneminen.html> accessed 9.10.2017. 
24 For example, close to the Russian border 4G technology cannot be utilised but 3G is operational. YLE, 




the Nordic countries. Harsh climate and vast distances set additional requirements for both 
technologies and companies maintaining them in the region.25 
This article leans on the aspects of human security defined in the 1994 UNDP report on 
human development. These aspects entail personal, community, environmental, health, food, 
economic, and political security. The article focuses on the impacts of digitisation, and the 
related insecurities, on healthcare in the European High North. Social security issues have 
been integrated in health security, because health and social security policies are bound 
together in the region. In the UNDP report, social security was to an extent included in 
economic security.26 The impacts of digitisation are examined from an individual’s 
perspective leaving community aspects aside.27 By anchoring the examination to the 
individual, the aim is to concretise the human security framework in the chosen situational 
setting. Thus, in its part, it strives to address the main criticism towards the framework as 
being too comprehensive to eventually say anything meaningful about security.28 Similarly, 
the concept has been criticised for arbitrarily separating and highlighting the seven aspects29, 
but the discussion falls outside the scope of this article. 
When the human being is shifted to the focus and made the referent object of cybersecurity, 
not only the perceived threats (from cyber threats to threats to human wellbeing) but also the 
implemented security measures transform. A comparison of the understandings is depicted in 
figure 1 beneath. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In the prevailing understanding of cybersecurity, threats to information, infrastructure and/or 
critical societal functions are presented either as taxonomies of technical threats or as 
strategic threat tables. The former list items such as malware, web based attacks, web 
application attacks, denial of service, botnets, phishing, spam, exploit kits, data breaches, and 
identity thefts.30 The latter usually include the categories of cyber activism (or hacktivism), 
cybercrime, politically and/or economically motivated espionage, cyber terrorism and cyber 
operations (or warfare) (increasing in estimated severity to the functioning of society).31 
Security measures then taken include technical, organizational and educational fixes to the 
perceived problems.32 
                                                             
25 For additional information see, for example, M Salminen, ‘Digital Security as an Aspect of Human Security 
in the Barents Region’ (forthcoming). 
26 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 1994’ 25-26 <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/ 
hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf> accessed 8.11.2016. 
27 Community aspects are addressed, for instance, in Kamrul Hossain’s article in this volume. 
28 For example, RE Howard-Hassman, ‘Human Security: Undermining Human Rights?’ (2012) 34 Human 
Rights Quarterly (1) 88; M Martin, ‘A Road Still to Be Travelled: Human Security and a Continuing Search for 
Meaning’ in S Takahashi (ed) Human Rights, Human Security, and State Security: The Intersection, vol 2 
(Praeger 2014). 
29 Gasper & Gomez (n 5) 14-19. 
30 ENISA, ‘Threat Landscape Report 2016. 15 Top Cyber-Threats and Trends’ (2017) <www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-2016> accessed 27.9.2017. 
31 For example, Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. Government Resolution 24.1.2013 
<https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/index.php/en/component/k2/38-cyber-security-strategy> accessed 27.9.2017; cf. 
E Tikk, ‘Ten Rules for Cyber Security’ (2011) 53 Survival (3) 119. 
32 For example, Alexander & Panguluri (n 11); Ginter (n 12); White (n 12). 
 
 
It has been argued that existing cybersecurity approaches focus more “on saving money or 
developing elegant technical solutions than on working and protecting lives and property”.33 
This misfocus can be addressed through an individual security approach. Moreover, both 
technical and strategic threat depictions remain fairly abstract and distant to people’s 
everyday experience. They make little sense to those not used to the professional discourse, 
transform quickly without becoming more coherent and, thus, sustain the knowledge-related 
power positions and divisions in, between, and across societies. While doing so, they 
marginalise the majority of population from political, economic and technical decision-
making processes in which the future of cyber-physical environment is decided.34 In order to 
open the discussion on digitalisation and cybersecurity to a wider public, the prevailing 
discourses are in need of refocusing and redefining. They need to be concretised and brought 
closer to people’s everyday experience. 
Discourses understandable in layman’s terms, as well as more inclusive strategies and 
programmes, enable individuals to strive for freedom from fear, want and indignity also in 
the digital environment. People’s fears are usually related to the unfamiliarity of ICTs, 
inexperience in their use, doubt in one’s own skills, and concerns of being excluded due to 
lacking knowledge and skills. Freedom from want entails that people do not fall victim to 
cybercrime, for instance, scams and cons; and that they are able to provide themselves, for 
example, by applying for jobs online, using the equipment and software at work, and/or 
claiming social security online. People ought to utilise ICTs fearlessly and with confidence. 
Freedom from indignity adds to the latter point by indicating that people should not become 
named and shamed online without evidence, treated as inferiors due to their treats, and all 
have access to the same services. In addition, they should not become victims of harassment, 
snooping and/or hate speech.35 In contradiction, ICTs ought to empower people to improve 
their everyday security and wellbeing in the cyber-physical environment.36 In the prevailing 
cybersecurity discourse, the positive, empowering side of security is easily neglected or 
becomes addressed in inadequate terms. Utilisation of human security framework can change 
this state of affairs.  
In an individual security approach to cybersecurity, the human being in his or her cyber-
physical environment becomes the object to be secured. Similarly, he or she becomes an 
active producer of security and gains a say in decision-making concerning digitalisation and 
cybersecurity. He or she is perceived as one of the stakeholders to attend the definition 
processes of digital development and cybersecurity. Threats to human wellbeing can be 
analysed, for example, in the context of the aforementioned seven aspects of human security. 
Security measures, again, become understood in a more comprehensive manner, including 
not only specific measures taken to safeguard the functioning of digital infrastructure and the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information, but also issues such as adequate 
                                                             
33 RR Schell, ‘Privacy and Security. Cyber Defense Triad for Where Security Matters’ (2016) 59 
Communications of the ACM (11) 20. 
34 For example, MG FPD Garcia, ‘Knowledge and New Technologies: From Ethics to Politics and Law’ in MV 
de Azevedo Cunha and others (eds) New Technologies and Human Rights: Challenges to Regulation (Routledge 
2016). 
35 For the frequency and consequences of such demoting acts see, for example, DK Citron, Hate Crimes in 
Cyberspace (Harvard University Press 2014) 35-55. 
36 See also E Mordini, ‘Considering the Human Implications of New and Emerging Technologies in the Area of 
Human Security’ (2014) 20 Science and Engineering Ethics (3) 617. 
 
 
income to acquire the necessary equipment and digital literacy to use the increasingly 
digitised services provided in the European High North. In the next section, I will turn to 
individual security in the cyber-physical environment in more detail. 
4. Individual Security in the Digitalising European High North 
In national cybersecurity strategies, as well as in many corporate policies, the individual is 
given a number of security-related roles. Firstly, he or she is recognised as a potential 
malevolent: a cybercriminal, a cyberterrorist, a cyber-mercenary, a digital spy, a grunted 
insider, or a hacktivist, who tries to raise attention towards a specific issue. Secondly, he or 
she may be a non-tech-savvy employee who endangers the organization by behaving in an 
unwise manner in the digital environment. Thirdly, he or she is expected to do his or her part 
in the production of comprehensive cybersecurity, for instance, by acquiring necessary 
security software; learning how to secure one’s own devices, networks and communication; 
improving his or her ICT-skills so that mistakes do not happen; as well as reading small 
prints in user agreements and acknowledging where liability lies in each case. The problem is 
that whereas the first group (usually) knows the cyber-physical environment rather well, the 
latter two neither know it nor wish to familiarise themselves with it.37 
While the existing societal (security) organizations are busy with finding solutions to the 
protection of meta- and meso-levels of cybersecurity (global, societal and organizational 
levels), the individual is often left alone to find ways to carry out his or her responsibility to 
secure him- or herself.38 The state of affairs is problematic, because for individuals who are 
not familiar with the principles of information security and/or cybersecurity, the demand for 
self-protection appears absurd. In addition, interest in the topic may be lacking. If one does 
not recognise risks inherent in the digitisation of his or her living environment or does not 
feel the need to worry about such things, one can hardly plan and execute security measures 
that may help mitigating risks and securing opportunities. In the opposing end of the 
continuum, intense cyber threat and risk discussion may prevent people from utilising ICTs 
or “seizing digital opportunities”. 
For analytical purposes, individual security in the cyber-physical environment is in this 
article divided into following categories: (1) physical security (often claimed to be improved 
through technical solutions promising less human error); (2) ICT-skills and confidence to act 
in the digital environment; (3) awareness of digital opportunities, but also of related 
vulnerabilities, risks and threats; (4) privacy issues; (5) a say in technology development; (6) 
felt (emotional) security; and (7) human rights questions in the cyber-physical environment. 
In practical terms, these aspects often overlap and become intertwined in everyday life. In 
this article, the focus is on the re-organization of health and social security in the Finnish 
Lapland. As from an individual’s perspective the safety of digitising health and social 
security services is also a question of personal security, the latter receives a fair amount of 
                                                             
37 Cf. B von Solms & J van Niekerk, ‘From Information Security to Cyber Security’ (2013) 38 Computers and 
Security 97; Gcaza and others (n 10). 
38 About individual decision-making in cybersecurity situations see, for example, H Rosoff, J Cui & RS John, 
‘Heuristics and biases in cyber security dilemmas’ (2013) 33 Environment Systems and Decisions (4) 517; N 
Ben-Asher & C Gonzalez, ‘Effects of cyber security knowledge on attack detection’ (2015) 48 Computers in 
Human Behavior 51. 
 
 
attention. I will begin with personal security concerns as they lay on the background when 
people evaluate the positive and negative impacts of digitalisation. 
4.1. Personal Security in the Cyber-Physical Environment 
In the UNDP report on human development, personal security is tied to physical security.39 
The report does not recognise the need to protect individuals in the digital environment, 
which can be explained by the lesser role that ICTs played in everyday life in the early 
1990’s (for example, email and internet browsers were only a few years old; commercial 
internet and the social media sites we know today did not exist40), as well as the then paucity 
of people’s experience with them. On the contrary, nowadays personal security ought to 
recognise the entanglement of physical and digital security – protection from harm caused by 
the state, other states, other groups of people, individuals and gangs, as well as cover threats 
at women, children and to self41 in any environment – and cover a wider range of issues 
emerging in the cyber-physical environment. Many of these issues relate to individuals’ 
everyday life as (1) customers of health and social security services, (2) objects of 
examination carried out by health and social security professionals and with digital clinical 
histories, (3) users of ICTs and digital health and social security services, (4) cost units 
evaluated by administrative decision makers as parts of wider data sets, (5) citizens with the 
related rights and obligations, and (6) psycho-physical entities bearing particular rights as 
human beings. 
In the context of cybersecurity, individuals’ personal security becomes easily reduced to 
technical questions of privacy – the protection, concealment and deletion of personal details; 
privacy of communication and of one’s premises; and/or the ability to select which 
information about one’s life becomes publicly available.42 Moreover, quite often the 
“cybersecurity dilemma” is presented as a continuous balancing act between security and 
privacy, which positions two integral dimensions of personal security as somehow 
oppositional.43 In the extreme, people may be expected to live a fully transparent life in order 
to assist security experts and authorities in the provision of (national and/or societal) security. 
“I have nothing to hide” thinking and the revenue model embedded in free information 
sharing on social media sites that requires corporations developing and maintaining these 
sites to push the users towards ever more sharing add to this transparency requirement.44 
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Regardless of the headlines raised by the concealed information collection practices of some 
states and corporations, people continue hand out information about their everyday life, 
including their health and social standing, hence contributing to the “loss of privacy”.45 
Nonetheless, an alternative approach exists recognising the mutually constitutive relationship 
between security and privacy. For the individual, privacy is an aspect of personal integrity. 
Personal security is hence not only about the protection, tampering or loss of data sets, but 
about one’s self-image and the ability to control to an extent his or her social appearance. 
Misplaced or disclosed personal details, as well as incorrect, profane information may lead to 
violations of one’s physical security, emotional wellbeing, or security of one’s possessions, 
as well as to a loss of reputation and/or income. Misused and/or abused personal details 
facilitate identity thefts that can be followed, for instance, by criminal charges. They may 
also cause any imaginable restriction to one’s individual freedom due to financial, legal or 
social obligations taken under one’s identity without the acknowledgement of the true owner 
of that identity. Fortunately, all national cybersecurity strategies effective in the European 
High North recognise the importance of privacy and the protection of human rights in the 
digital environment.46 Yet, the daily news about, for example, data breaches, accidental data 
disclosures, online scams and frauds, successful phishing operations, or purposeful data 
exposures and smearing testify that people and organizations are only partially able to protect 
digitised information.  
Privacy is not the only concern of personal security in the European High North. A 
considerable amount of public and private services are either primarily or only provided in 
the digital format in the region. Development in the provisioning of health and social security 
is heavily geared towards this direction. Reasoning on the background can be found, for 
instance, in opportunities provided by developing ICTs and automation, cost-efficiency, 
fragmentation of daily routines and hence the need to make services available all-day round, 
reduced need to travel long distances, and the globalization of service markets. For example, 
in Finland the development of digital public services began in the 1990’s when, according to 
government strategies, they were developed to support physical service provisioning. Over 
the years, digital services became first equivalent to physical services and, finally, the 
primary form of service provisioning.47 Similar development has taken place in Norway.48 
However, the digital skills and awareness of individuals have not followed the same 
development curve. When being asked, people express concern over their own and others’ 
ability, know-how and comprehension to use digital services, as well as their preference to 
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talk to a person face-to-face.49 For example, according to an EU-wide Eurobarometer survey, 
67 per cent of Europeans thought digitalisation has had a positive impact on their quality of 
life. Similarly, 71 per cent found themselves having the sufficient skills to use ICTs in 
everyday life, whereas 65 per cent considered themselves skilled enough to use digitised 
public services.50 In other words, around 30 per cent of people do not think they are skilled 
enough to operate in the digital environment or that digitalisation has improved their 
wellbeing. Furthermore, large differences exists “in perceptions related to digital skills across 
Europe, depending on the country, age or educational background”.51 Especially for an 
unaccustomed internet-user, the services likely appear complicated, confusing, difficult to use 
and unreliable. 
Without a full confidence to use digital services, people easily become afraid of utilising 
them.52 Advice and support to the users has been arranged, for instance, by municipalities, 
non-government organizations, volunteers, service providers and state authorities in their still 
remaining physical service points53, but people utilise or do not utilise the provided support 
for a number of reasons. They may feel ashamed of their lacking skills and understanding, 
protest against digitalisation, get frustrated with the seemingly non-functioning services, or 
find it difficult to learn new ways of operating. In sparsely populated areas where everyone 
knows one another people also express unwillingness to bring their interests, needs and fears 
to the knowledge of fellow villagers. In addition, people with disabilities report on difficulties 
in using digital services tailored for the imaginary average user.54 
Individuals’ personal security in the cyber-physical environment hence depends on whether 
one trusts the environment and has the confidence, skills and ability to harness the known 
digital opportunities to his or her benefit. Without the aforementioned capabilities one may 
become excluded from service provisioning to his or her detriment, which feeds into both felt 
and objectively measurable personal insecurity. Insecurity is generated and sustained by 
one’s negative experiences, fears and concerns, experiences of other people (either directly or 
indirectly consulted), news and social media stories, as well as one’s assessment of whether 
wrongdoings become remedied. In the development of trust in the cyber-physical 
environment an important role is played by the product and service providers, as well as by 
the administrative systems organized to both facilitate and control the development. Whether 
the providers are developing secure products and services, and whether people adopt them 
and learn to use them in a safe manner, is a condition of prime importance. In addition, the 
regulatory framework – industries’ self-regulation, national and international regulation, as 
well as regulation carried out through transnational voluntary organizations working on 
technology governance – frames each digital encounter. People’s experiences may be 
conveyed to product, service and regulatory development through, for instance, market 
surveys, collected test-user experiences, polls and studies. However, in these forms of 
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experience collection the questions are decided upon by the commissioners of the research 
while people have a little free say. 
Yet it ought to be highlighted that digitalisation empowers people to improve their personal 
security. Firstly, it generally amends people’s access to information that can be used to 
enhance their well-being. A limitless number of information sources exist online – the 
difficulty lies in recognising the most trustful ones. Moreover, (public) service providers are 
increasingly opening their registers so that individuals can check, correct and, to an extent, 
control and benefit from their personal data.55 Furthermore, by googling one’s own name, 
one can check what has been published about him or her online. If the need arises, he or she 
can request service providers to take down, for example, factually wrong and/or dishonouring 
claims.56 Secondly, enhanced connectivity enables, inter alia, social interaction and running 
errands across time and distances. Thus, increased flexibility and subsequently lessened need 
to travel, for instance, decreases the chances of traffic accidents and reduces environmental 
footprint. Easier exchange of news between family members, friends, colleagues, peers and 
other significant others improves emotional well-being and the feeling of being secure.57 
Thirdly, the ability to publish and actively disseminate information about wrongdoings, for 
example, human rights violations can result in sufficient regional, national or transnational 
pressure to interfere in or change the situation (can also lead to the worsening of the 
situation). For instance, through online information dissemination the general awareness of 
the situation of the Sámi has risen. 
From an individual’s perspective, the aforementioned opportunities for eased everyday life 
are the main benefits of the digitisation of health and social security services. Cost-efficiency 
in service production is a secondary concern – unlike in political and/or administrative 
decision-making. Similarly, the aforementioned personal security concerns trouble people in 
service digitisation as they ponder upon the trustworthiness, reliability, and usability of 
digital services. In the next section, the discussion is concretised further through a case study 
of the dispute present in the on-going restructuring of healthcare and social security in the 
Finnish Lapland. 
4.2. Health and Social Security in Länsi-Pohja 
The change caused by digitalisation in people’s everyday life has been tangible in the 
provisioning of health and social security services. Over the past twenty years, these services 
have been privatised and digitised to a great extent in the European High North.58 In terms of 
human security, health security is depicted in the UNDP report on human development as 
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protection from diseases, malnutrition, unhealthy lifestyles and harmful environmental 
impacts. It also entails access to healthcare. Threats to health security are noted to be greatest 
for the poorest, people living in rural areas, racial minorities, and children.59 Social security, 
again, is in the report attached to one’s ability to provide him- or herself and the family. It is 
defined as “compensation for loss of income for the sick and temporarily disabled; payments 
to the elderly, the permanently disabled and the unemployed; family, maternity and child 
allowances and the cost of welfare services”.60 The report remarks that such social safety net 
exists in the minority of the world’s countries and is everywhere under curtailment.61 All 
Nordic states belong to this group of countries. 
In this article, only the main features of regional digitalisation are touched upon for the issue-
area is wide and develops quickly. They are discussed in the context of health and social 
security re-organization in Länsi-Pohja. Under scrutiny is a dispute between the Finnish 
government, two existing healthcare districts in Lapland (Länsi-Pohja and Lappi), a private 
multinational healthcare corporation (Mehiläinen) and its competitors (Pihlajalinna, Attendo 
and Terveystalo), as well as the two towns (Kemi and Tornio) and four municipalities 
(Keminmaa, Simo, Tervola and Ylitornio) comprising Länsi-Pohja. The area lies in south-
western Lapland bordering Sweden and, in fact, Tornio and Haparanda in Sweden constitute 
a twin city across the border. Healthcare and social security services in Länsi-Pohja may be 
provided in both Finnish and Swedish languages62, whereas in northern Lapland service 
provisioning in both Finnish and the Sámi languages is a bigger concern63. At the moment of 
writing, both Lappish healthcare districts have a central hospital (Länsi-Pohja has one in 
Kemi and Lappi has one in Rovaniemi) with emergency duties. The dispute centres on the 
threat of eliminating some of the hospital functions in Kemi so that those would only be 
carried out in Rovaniemi about 100 km away. The structural change affects over 60 000 
people living in the area. The overall population of Lapland is slightly over 180 000 people 
and its geographical size is about one-third of the overall area of Finland. 
The dispute embeds in two Finnish government projects: one of digitising a bigger share of 
public services and another of restructuring health and social security service provisioning in 
the country. The programme facilitating the running of errands digitally and e-democracy 
(SADe-programme) was established in 2009 with the aim of producing good quality and 
interoperable digital services in the public sector. Digitisation was to generate cost efficiency 
and savings, as well as benefits for citizens, corporations, communities, municipalities and 
state officials. Principles that guided the programme, which ended in 2015, included co-
development with service users, adequate information security, utilisation of market solutions 
and innovations from the private sector, advancement of open data and the use of open source 
code in public administration, and bilingual service provisioning.64 
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In Lapland, the digitisation of health and social security services, including the development 
of the virtu.fi service portal, was funded through the SADe-programme. In the virtu.fi -portal, 
the residents of Lappish towns and municipalities65 can, for instance, use a number of metrics 
and calculators for self-evaluation, book an appointment with a healthcare or a social security 
professional, contact professionals via videophone, use a documentation camera for 
preliminary diagnostics, fill in pre-registration forms, and utilise general advice provided. In 
addition, they can check their digital medical histories in the national omakanta.fi service 
portal66, add and/or correct the information, as well as utilise a number of other digital 
services provided by public, private or third sector service providers.67 Digitisation of 
services has, for instance, speeded up diagnostics in rural areas, enabled people to renew their 
prescriptions without meeting a doctor face-to-face, and smoothened the transfer of 
information to and amongst service providers. The virtu.fi -portal also provides support 
services to healthcare and social security professionals, such as online consultation platforms, 
consultation opportunities via videophone, general advice, secure information transfer 
channels, and online reporting platforms.68 Digitalisation is one of the focus areas of the 
current government and digitisation of public services is one of its flagship projects.69 
The restructuring of healthcare and social security is a recurrent issue in Finnish politics. The 
on-going re-organization is one of the reforms put forward in the government programme. 
The plan is to move the responsibility for the provisioning of healthcare and social security 
from municipalities to 18 counties to be established by 2020. The goal is that everyone has an 
equal access to these services and that freedom of choice can be executed in a broad manner. 
Digitalisation is one of the ways to strive towards this goal. Service queues ought to shorten, 
people to have an appointment quicker, data to travel smoothly between service providers, 
and people still to be able to use services close to their place of residence and/or where they 
prefer. Service providers can come from public, private, as well as voluntary sectors.70 
Implementation of the re-organization programme has proven to be difficult, because it 
generates schism and disputes within and between the different levels of state administration, 
amongst service providers, amongst decision makers and people using the services, as well as 
between population centres and rural areas. Currently, different areas in the country are 
moving forward at different paces and with varying plans as the overarching legislative basis 
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is uncertain and the government has had to change its implementation plans for several times. 
In Lapland, the re-organization of service structure was prepared in Lapin Sote-Savotta -
project which ran between 2014 and 2017. The aim was to create a tailored, innovative 
service network that could safeguard service provisioning to all residents of the region. It 
achieved positive results, but also contributed to the dispute under scrutiny in this article.71 
The case study of Länsi-Pohja is carried out by presenting a short historical narrative and the 
main security concerns in the dispute as they can be read from the regional news website of 
the national broadcasting company, YLE Lappi. 72 The pieces of news were collected by 
searching with different combinations of keywords “sote”, “Länsi-Pohja”, “Kemi” and “sote 
uudistus” in December 2017. When a piece of news recommended further readings, the 
additional readings were included in the data. Only news published while the current 
government has been in power were included.73 Thus, a sample of 79 news articles published 
between 16th of June 2015 and 22nd of December 2017 was collected.74 The data source was 
selected for its national coverage, that is, its readership does not restrict to, for instance, 
people subscribing to local newspapers or receiving free newsletters in the region. 
The recurrent themes around which the dispute revolves are related to people’s fear for 
disappearing or deteriorating physical healthcare and social security services; increasing 
travel times and distances; degenerating economic situation within the area and its lessening 
attractiveness amongst students, working people, and health and social security professionals; 
as well as the loss of areal self-determination. Within the regional administration, the 
contradicting fears are for the loss of regional income and self-determination if people from 
Länsi-Pohja begin to run their errands in Oulu75, instead of Rovaniemi, thus generating an 
outflow of capital to Northern Ostrobothnia.76 Additionally, the fear is for an inability to 
provide health and social security services equally in the entire Lapland. For the government, 
the main concern is that the Länsi-Pohja case generates a model for other areas to follow 
hence endangering the already agreed national re-organization programme. I will next 
examine these themes further. 
National re-organization of healthcare and social security services was on the agendas of 
previous governments, but it became re-planned when the current government began its 
work. Negotiations for the re-organization in Lapland were carried out between the 
representatives of both healthcare districts, as well as those of the towns and municipalities. 
When the Lapin Sote-Savotta -project was running, it became clear that significant 
differences existed in the opinions of Länsi-Pohja healthcare district and those of Lappi 
healthcare district concerning future service provisioning. Media reports about these 
differences of opinion pointed out that the representatives of Länsi-Pohja felt that their 
concerns were not addressed or even heard in the negotiations, but the representatives of 
Lappi were pushing for service centralisation to Rovaniemi. Lappi responded by pointing 
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towards requirements set by legislation and practical necessities in cases where legislation per 
se did not require centralisation. On the background was mistrust felt towards the negotiating 
partner due to past experiences, for instance, from an earlier re-organization process of 
highest occupational education. Länsi-Pohja felt that it had lost the university of applied 
sciences to Rovaniemi as a result of unfair negotiations. Fears for similar development and 
unhappiness with the negotiating process were expressed. The discontinuation of basic 
healthcare provisioning close to the customers, as well as the removal of delivery ward and 
extensive emergency duties away from Länsi-Pohja central hospital, were the main 
concerns.77 Consequently, while the negotiations were on-going, the towns and 
municipalities of Länsi-Pohja reactivated the examination of alternatives for health and social 
security provisioning.78 
One of the options investigated was an extensive outsourcing of healthcare services to a 
private corporation. Which services would be outsourced, and to what extent, was to be 
decided by each town and municipality. The suggested outsourcing format was the 
establishment of a co-owned company of which the private corporation would have the 
biggest share, while the towns and municipalities would become minority partners.79 The 
primary goal was to ensure that physical service provisioning in Länsi-Pohja would remain at 
the existing level also in the future. People would have both basic and special healthcare 
services provided close to their place of residence. Psychiatric and rehabilitation services, 
surgical operations, as well as the delivery ward would continue in the area. Education and 
occupational training of healthcare professionals would continue hence providing the 
necessary workforce. The industries located in the area could rely on the emergency response 
capability of the healthcare sector also in the future.80 When the negotiations between Länsi-
Pohja and Lappi were on-going, the examination of other alternatives was presented merely 
as an option. However, it was also interpreted as a means of pressuring the negotiating 
partner and the government – both of which were in the media presented as unwilling to 
listen to the local concerns and, thus, taken by surprise by the decisions finally made in town 
and municipality councils.81 
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In the spring 2017, the negotiations about the division of work between Länsi-Pohja and 
Lappi in the future county of Lapland ended without a result.82 Towns and municipalities in 
Länsi-Pohja intensified the examination of the outsourcing option83 and, eventually, put out a 
tender. Three offers were accepted for further negotiations – one from Mehiläinen, one from 
Pihlajalinna and one combined from the offers of Attendo and Terveystalo.84 When the 
examination of outsourcing was on its way, the representatives of Lappi healthcare district, 
the management of the future county of Lapland, as well as the government reacted to the 
development. Appeals for returning to the negotiating table with Lappi healthcare district 
were presented and disinterest of the representatives of Länsi-Pohja to participate in the 
common planning was wondered.85 Some local and national politicians, the Union of Health 
and Social Care Professionals, some healthcare professionals, as well as local people pointed 
out that outsourcing would not safeguard services and jobs in the area. Furthermore, as the 
prime operating principle of a private corporation is to generate profit to its owners, this was 
presumed to rule over the local needs.86 Others, including doctors working in the Kemi 
central hospital, saw outsourcing as the only option for otherwise decision-making power 
would shift to Rovaniemi and service provisioning in the area reduce.87 In many town and 
municipality councils, the decision was to be made between the evils of outsourcing and the 
fears of losing jobs and services. The outsourcing plan would move forward only, if every 
town and municipality agreed to the plan.88 Negotiation failure with regard to the division of 
work in the future county of Lapland quickly politicised the dispute – which, to an extent, 
was also advocated for the wide ranging decision-making needs exceeded the mandate of 
healthcare districts.89 
When it began to look more likely that the towns and municipalities of Länsi-Pohja would 
opt for outsourcing, the government decided to establish a team of two investigators, both 
former ministers living in Lapland, tasked to provide a compromise solution to the dispute.90 
The move had already been suggested by the head of Lappi healthcare district.91 The 
government also quickly put forward a bill to tighten the conditions under which towns and 
municipalities could do such outsourcing decisions. As the bill would become enforceable 
earliest in the beginning of 2018, the towns and municipalities in Länsi-Pohja also speeded 
up their processes. The outsourcing agreement with the selected private provider would have 
to be signed before the end of 2017 to be probated.92 In the media, the Minister of Family 
Affairs and Social Services, as well as the Prime Minister, gave statements in which they 
found the on-going development highly detrimental and dangerous for the nation-wide re-
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organization project.93 The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health published calculations 
according to which the ligature of one-third of the budget of the future county of Lapland to 
the provision of health and social security in Länsi-Pohja would endanger the independency 
of the county. As it seemed unlikely that the county would be able to arrange all of its 
obligatory tasks with the resources allocated to it, the possibility of combining it with the 
county of Northern Ostrobothnia entered the media discussion.94 
The dispute culminated in autumn 2017. The personnel of the Kemi central hospital, for 
instance, organized a demonstration regarding the future of the hospital. Statements both for 
and against the co-owned company were presented. A separate demonstration opposing 
outsourcing was organized a few days later.95 Nevertheless, town and municipality councils 
in Länsi-Pohja decided to proceed with the co-owned company plan. This company would 
take care of the services that were nationally allocated to the basket of services which 
provider customers could freely choose, such as the maintenance of healthcare centres and, in 
this case, of an entire central hospital. The length of the agreement would be 15 years and the 
termination of the contract would cost the towns and municipalities – and hence also the 
future county of Lapland – about 100 million euros. Additionally, services provided to 
families and elderly people, as well as the public authority functions, would be moved to the 
extended healthcare district until taken over by the future county of Lapland.96 Each town 
and municipality would participate in the restructuring of healthcare in ways that best served 
its interests.97  
In the media, the government was accused of pressuring and fear mongering after an initially 
deferred reaction to the security concerns expressed by the people of Länsi-Pohja.98 Lappi 
healthcare district and the management of the future county of Lapland were accused of 
having by-passed the interests, needs and fears of people living and industries operating in 
Länsi-Pohja, while preferring the centralisation of services and valuing money over human 
beings.99 Representatives of Länsi-Pohja were accused of taking the overall re-organization 
of healthcare and social security as a hostage for selfish reasons and without considering what 
would be best for entire Lapland. This selfishness was said to endanger, amongst others, 
health and social security provisioning in other areas of Lapland.100 The Union of Health and 
Social Care Professionals felt that they had not had a say.101 Finally, the broadcasting 
company YLE was accused of propagating for the outsourcing option.102 People living in 
Länsi-Pohja, as well as in other areas of Lapland, had differing opinions about the topic. In 
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the media, they expressed fears for uncertainty regarding, for instance, the pricing and 
availability of services in the future, whether familiar personnel would be present in 
healthcare stations, how people without the abilities to make decisions about their own care 
would be taken into consideration, and what would happen to child health services or 
healthcare in schools.103 
After the outsourcing decision was made in Länsi-Pohja, pressure towards Rovaniemi for 
coming further to the half-way intensified in the media. Such advice was given, for example, 
by the members of parliament representing the region. Willingness to continue negotiations 
was also expressed by the representatives of Rovaniemi.104 Simultaneously, negotiations 
between the chosen private corporation, Mehiläinen, and the towns and municipalities of 
Länsi-Pohja continued on the details, such as which healthcare services would be provided 
where and how.105 The area also continued investing in equipment and facilities.106 One of 
the other bidders, Pihlajalinna, complained to the Market Court about the outsourcing 
process.107 The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health tasked the Regional State 
Administrative Agency of Lapland to investigate the legality of the outsourcing decision.108 
According to the Agency, giving a final statement was impossible before the signing of the 
contract, but in principle the decision was legal.109 A sequel was played in Kemi. After 
having suspended the processing of the outsourcing decision and hence attempting to prevent 
the mayor from signing the contract, the town’s executive committee faced a vote of no 
confidence.110 The committee eventually granted the mayor to sing111, which happened 
before Christmas (Kemi, Tornio, Simo, Keminmaa, Länsi-Pohja healthcare district and 
Mehiläinen as signatories). The contract came to force in the beginning of 2018.112 
Neither social services nor digitalisation ever became a major item in the discussion. Instead, 
the dispute centred on the location of physical healthcare service points. While digitisation 
changes both the reach and availability of health and social security services, it was only 
mentioned, for instance, when the future provisioning of healthcare was envisioned. Special 
healthcare was expected to become increasingly mobile and utilise novel digital services to a 
great extent.113 Basic healthcare would also be arranged so that a nurse accompanied with a 
computer would visit the customer in his or her home, instead of the customer coming to see 
the nurse in a healthcare centre.114 A representative of Lappi healthcare district regretted that 
the representatives of Länsi-Pohja had been unwilling to consider the advantages 
digitalisation in service provisioning.115 Additionally, private healthcare corporations had 
already pointed out that they would also examine opportunities for service digitisation.116 The 
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personal security concerns related to digitalisation that were outlined in the previous section 
of this article never entered the media discussion on future healthcare and social security 
provisioning in Länsi-Pohja. 
It seems that the nation-wide re-organization of health and social security services, including 
the digitisation of these services, moves ahead without much dialogue with people’s everyday 
experience. The re-organization is pushed forward for economic and administrative reasons 
while justifying it in terms of improved service provisioning, increased freedom of choice, 
and more customer say. Centralisation and digitalisation are the guiding stars for the future. 
On the contrary, and leaving the regional power struggles aside, people are primarily 
concerned about the reduction of everyday security due to the disappearance of physical 
healthcare service points from their area of residence – not asking for more digitalisation, 
access to these services from their homes, and/or the ability to freely choose their service 
providers. As the current development is proceeding to the opposing direction, it creates and 
sustains individual security concerns in the Finnish Lapland.117 Digitalisation is not a trend 
that can be overturned, but it should be integrated in policy discussions across issue-areas so 
that its consequences; alternative policy choices; the associated opportunities, but also threats 
and risks; as well as people’s expectations and experiences would become part of the 
decision-making concerning the future development of the cyber-physical European High 
North. 
5. A More Inclusive Digital Framework for the European High North is Required 
In people’s perceptions, their everyday security does not revolve around digitalisation. As the 
case of Länsi-Pohja presents, cybersecurity questions related to individual security are not 
discussed even when the re-organization of health and social security in the Finnish Lapland 
generates major disputes within the region and between regional and national policy 
processes. The conversion of digital and physical, and the related penetration of ICTs to 
virtually all aspects of human life, lay on the background of this societal restructuring. 
However, the expressed security concerns relate to physical service provisioning, even if the 
opportunities generated by digitalisation drive the ongoing societal transformation. It is a 
failure of politicians and administrative policy makers, if they cannot reason, explain and 
justify the chosen policy options and address the security concerns hence generated and/or 
intensified. Instead of threat politics, a constructive dialogue remarking people’s interests, 
needs and fears ought to be utilised. Digitalisation should thus not be discussed as a separate 
issue-area, for example, from health and social security. Furthermore, cybersecurity should 
not be isolated into another issue-area where technology and/or national security 
professionals discuss in highly abstract terms about the functionality of society in all security 
situations, but to be brought into everyday security discussions. Opportunities generated by 
digitalisation are the reason for its political and administrative advancement, but these neither 
coincide with people’s desires nor become well conveyed in the discussion. 
Usually, when digitalisation and cybersecurity are discussed in the context of healthcare, the 
discourse does not revolve around user interfaces or people’s experiences with or fears for 
service digitisation. Instead, it concentrates on, for example, increasingly precise care, robot-
assisted or fully automated operations, and optimisation of churn times. In social security, the 
discourse focuses on internet-based self-service and reporting portals, safe money transfers, 
                                                             
117 About the decreasing influence of rural areas in decision-making see, for example, YLE 20.11.2017. 
 
 
and professional-customer communication via digital means. The envisioned outlook of both 
health and social security depend on functioning ICTs and their safe use. In particular, in the 
sparsely populated regions, where the physical service network is already thin. By engaging 
the local people as customers of health and social security services, objects of professional 
examination who have digital clinical histories, users of ICTs and digital services, cost units 
in service provisioning, citizens, as well as human beings who bear particular rights, in the 
decision-making concerning the cyber-physical future of the European High North both the 
awareness of and felt satisfaction with the re-organization of health and social security can be 
increased. People will thus gain a say in the development of their living environment. 
People need to be aware of digital services and have the skills to use them. Regardless of the 
campaigns run and support provided, many are still not familiar with the services. In addition, 
people need the confidence and mental strength to use the services, which may be an 
obstacle, for instance, for individuals with mental health issues. Next to that, they need 
internet banking credentials or digital ID-cards to use the services, which cannot be taken for 
granted. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of digital health and social security 
services ought to be guaranteed in all situations, which has turned out to be a challenge. If a 
digital service is not available, malfunctions or does not provide adequate guidance, the legal 
protection of the service users should not become endangered.118 In sum, there is a number of 
issues that require settling so that people know what digital services exist, know how to use 
them, receive the support they need in utilising them, will not be marginalised because of 
digitisation, and will be treated equally in service provisioning. 
Moreover, health and social security provisioning depends, for instance, on functioning 
power and water infrastructures which are either run or directed through ICTs. It also embeds 
in the national, supranational and international networks of, for instance, logistics or 
medicine and appliances manufacturing which also depend on functioning digital 
infrastructure. Problems in any of the networks and/or infrastructures has significant 
consequences in people’s everyday life.119 Therefore, they should also be openly discussed. 
The aim should be not to increase fears and/or concerns, but to enhance individual security 
and wellbeing by sharing information, addressing existing concerns, and taking desires into 
consideration. 
Digitalisation creates a shift in responsibility from the public (or less frequently private) 
administration to the individual. As there are more online forms to fill in and more service 
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platforms to use, the individual becomes the one required to master all of these forms and 
platforms. He or she is expected to know what information to provide on which platform, 
where to find the platforms and how to use them, manage a range of security credentials, 
remember when to update the details or check the test results. Of course, if he or she is tech-
savvy, many of the services can be synched and/or reminders sent to one’s smartphone or 
email about scheduled meetings. Yet, every additional link increases the complexity and 
vulnerability of the entirety hence also increasing security challenges. Moreover, these links 
are becoming increasingly automatized, which means that more information is collected 
directly from, for example, heart rate monitors and blood pressure meters without human 
interference. Yet, even if ICTs do not operate as expected, the blame is currently on the 
individual customer.  
This article does not wish to challenge or deny digital opportunities, but aims at broadening 
and deepening the discourse. From an individual’s perspective, health and social security 
does not only involve as quick and precise care as possible, but also one’s ability to follow 
his or her own care, acquire information, make informed decisions, and have a say in the 
means through which his or her health and social situation is supported. In principle, the on-
going developments to compile data to single service portals and to grant people the right to 
check and correct their personal information are taking the development to a good direction. 
Nonetheless, they also face the challenge of people not being aware and having troubles in 
using the platforms, as well as information and cybersecurity challenges recognised by the 
mainstream cybersecurity discourse. When people’s personal details are collected to single 
databases, security concerns and potentials for abuse ought to be carefully addressed.120 
Individuals’ personal security concerns should prevail, instead of administrative cost-
efficiency pressures. 
Defining of a cybersecurity culture specific to the European High North, and thus recognising 
its regional characteristics, could be a partial answer the challenges depicted throughout this 
article.121 It is likely that cybersecurity concerns related to personal security become more 
actual for individuals, when they become accustomed to digitised service provisioning with 
both its pros and cons. When they do, an open and engaging dialogue should be part of the 
cybersecurity culture. Alongside the embedded threats and risks, it should highlight the 
positive, enabling sides of digitalisation and cybersecurity that empower people to improve 
their wellbeing. Centring on individuals’ physical and emotional security, ICT-skills and 
confidence to act in the digital environment, digital awareness, privacy issues, and human 
rights questions in the cyber-physical environment, the culture could better reason the 
importance of security measures taken at all levels of society. Instead of abstracts concerns, it 
ought to concentrate on practical security questions that people encounter in their everyday 
life in the cyber-physical European High North. 
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APPENDIX 1: Research data 
News articles collected from YLE web portal <www.yle.fi> 
16.6.2015 Tornion uusi kaupunginjohtaja: Kuntien tehtävät on mietittävä uusiksi / J Tiihonen 
9.11.2015 "Kaikkea päivystystä ei voi keskittää 12 paikkaan" / R Rautiainen 
12.11.2015 Kansalaisaloite kaatui – Länsi-Pohjassa uskotaan silti omaan synnytysosastoon / H 
Hannukainen 
26.1.2016 Lapissa valmistaudutaan maakuntahallintoon luottamustapaamisilla / A Passoja 
6.4.2016 "Mahdollisuudet hyvään mutta myös riskejä" – miten Lapin käy sote-uudistuksessa? 
/ A Leppävuori 
12.4.2016 Länsi-Pohja valmistelee omaa sotea – hallituksen linjaus on luettu tarkkaan / K 
Marttala 
2.5.2016 Kaatuuko Meri-Lapin kuntien soteyhtiö uuteen lakiin? / J Tiihonen 
17.5.2016 Sipilän ja Saamelaiskäräjien tapaamisen keskiössä pohjoismainen saamelaissopimus 
ja sote-uudistus / M Alajärvi 
19.5.2016a Länsi-Pohjassa odotetaan ympärivuokautisen päivystykseen säilyvän alueella / K 
Marttala 
19.5.2016b Tässä ovat sote-uudistuksen laajan päivystyksen sairaalat / T de Fresnes 
16.6.2016 Sote-muutosjohtaja: Virtuaalinen sairaanhoito syrjäseutujen pelastus / A Passoja 
20.6.2016 Hanna Mäntylä: Valinnanvapaus ei saa johtaa monopoliasemaan / J Tiihonen 
4.7.2016 600 sivua sotea, saamelaisista muutama maininta / P Näkkäläjärvi & G Satokangas 
28.8.2016 Viisi tarinaa sote-myrskyn silmästä – uudistus kätilön mielessä päivittäin: "Mitä 
tämä diipadaapa-puhe tarkoittaa?" / E Kuivas 
27.10.2016 Länsi-Pohjan synnytykset jatkuvat ainakin kaksi vuotta / A Heikinmatti 
9.11.2016 Länsi-Pohjan sote-valmistelu käynnistyi / K Vaara 
18.11.2016 Nopea netti mahdollistaa etätyön syrjäkylälläkin – saavatko kunnat nyt uusia 
asukkaita? / K Vaara 
22.3.2017 Erikoissairaanhoitoa viedään Kemistä Rovaniemelle – sairaanhoitopiirien 
neuvottelut katkesivat erimielisyyksiin / A Heikinmatti 
23.3.2017 Merilappilaiset voivat äänestää soteasiassa jaloillaan – "Se on maakunnalle iso 
suonenisku" / A Heikinmatti 
24.3.2017a "Ei ole mitään järkeä pistää sadan miljoonan investoinnit Rovaniemelle ja jättää 
kunnossaoleva infra käyttämättä" / A Heikinmatti 
24.3.2017b Keminmaa alkaa selvittää sosiaali- ja terveyspalveluiden yksityistämistä / J 
Mehtonen 
27.3.2017 Kansanedustaja Kulmuni: Synnytykset jatkuvat Kemissä ja Lappiin jää kaksi 
keskussairaalaa / J Tiihonen 
12.4.2017a Vasemmistopuolueet vastustavat soten yksityistämistä Meri-Lapissa / A Heikinmatti 
12.4.2017b Länsi-Pohjan sote voi ratketa Kemin demareiden kantaan / J Tiihonen 
13.4.2017 Kemin demarit linjasivat: Ei Meri-Lapin sote-ratkaisulle / M Aula 
24.4.2017 Kemi sanoi kyllä Meri-Lapin sote-ratkaisun edistämiselle – Ylitornio tyrmäsi / J 
Mehtonen 
25.4.2017 Meri-Lapin sote-ratkaisu aiheutti Kemin valtuustossa kiivasta keskustelua – näin 
valtuutetut äänestivät / J Mehtonen 
28.4.2017 Konsulttiyhtiö tekee selvityksen Lapin sairaalatyönjaosta / J Mehtonen 




14.6.2017 Meri-Lapin sote pysähtyy kesän ajaksi – yksityisen palveluntuottajan valinta 
lykkääntyy / M Aula 
5.7.2017a Vuoden aikalisä sotessa kelpaa Lapille kunhan valtio korvaa kulut / T Räihä 
5.7.2017b Ritva Sonntag: Meri-Lapin sote-yhteisyrityksestä päättämistä pitäisi siirtää / A 
Heikinmatti 
15.8.2017 Länsi-Pohjan keskussairaalaan uutta laitteistoa syöpä- ja sepelvaltimotauteja varten / 
R Rautiainen 
21.9.2017 Tervola päättää uudesta sote-ulkoistuksen selvityksestä – kesällä ulkoistus kaatui 
Pihlajalinnan vetäytymiseen / J Tiihonen 
26.9.2017 Henriksson: Uusi laki estäisi leikkaukset myös yksityissairaaloissa – lakialoite 
aluesairaaloiden tueksi saa kannatusta myös hallituspuolueista / A Vihanta 
10.10.2017 Kattaako asiakasseteli vain osan kustannuksista? – Länsi-Pohjan sairaanhoitopiirin 
johtaja kaipaa tietoa soten asiakasmaksuista / J Tiihonen 
19.10.2017 Lääkärit pelkäävät sairaalan alasajoa: Sairauskohtauksen hoitoviive voisi olla 
kohtalokas ja teollisuuden suuronnettomuus mahdoton hoitaa / J Mehtonen 
23.10.2017 Mehiläiselle eniten pisteitä Länsi-Pohjan sote-yhteisyritykseen / J Tiihonen 
27.10.2017 Meri-Lapista erittäin vähän hakijoita Lapin maakunta- ja sote-uudistuksen 
valmisteluun / J Tiihonen 
3.11.2017a Kepuministeriltä tiukkaa sotesanelua Länsi-Pohjaan – "Törkeää poliittista 
vallankäyttöä" / T Rantamartti 
3.11.2017b Sairaalan alasajo veisi Meri-Lapista kaikkiaan jopa 1000 työpaikkaa – kaupat, 
palvelut, koulutus ja asuntomarkkinat kärsisivät / J Mehtonen 
3.11.2017c Lapin ja Länsi-Pohjan välit tulehtuneet – Lapin sairaanhoitopiirin johtaja ehdottaa 
avuksi "valtakunnan viisaita" / H Hannukainen 
9.11.2017a Länsi-Pohjan työntekijöiden huoli mielenilmauksessa – "Ollaanko meidät 
hylkäämässä" / M Aula 
9.11.2017b Meri-Lapin sote-tilanteesta kaksi mielenilmausta / M Aula 
10.11.2017 Ministeriö lähetti Meri-Lapin kuntapäättäjille harhaanjohtavia lukuja tärkeää 
päätöstä edeltävänä yönä – "Jos ministeriöstä lähetetään jotakin, niin sen luulisi 
olevan faktaa" / J Mehtonen; K Marttala & M Aula 
13.11.2017 Kemin kaupunginvaltuusto päätti sote-yhteisyritykseen liittymisestä äänin 22–21 / J 
Mehtonen 
14.11.2017a Lapissa tehtiin historiaa: Kokonainen keskussairaala ulkoistetaan / M Aula 
14.11.2017b Hallitus sai Meri-Lapin sote-pähkinän purtavaksi – valtuutetut päättivät 
jättiulkoistuksesta / J Mehtonen & M Aula 
14.11.2017c Rovaniemi pettyi Meri-Lapin sote-ratkaisuun – "Onko Lapilla edellytyksiä jatkaa 
itsenäisenä" / J Tiihonen 
15.11.2017a Kemiläispoliitikko sote-palveluiden ulkoistamisesta: "Oli musta aukko ja sitten oli 
jotain konkreettista" / L Haapanen 
15.11.2017b Saarikko ärtyi terveysfirmoille - "Miksi suuryritykset samaan aikaan vaativat 
valinnanvapautta ja betonoivat nykytilaa?" / M Stenroos 
15.11.2017c Hallitus yrittää estää Meri-Lapin taudin leviämistä – lakia tiukennetaan / M Stenroos 
16.11.2017a Sipilä huolestui sairaaloiden kohtalosta: "Yksityiset monopolit ottavat asian 
haltuunsa" / V Sundqvist 
16.11.2017b Analyysi: Sipilän hallitus koki kolauksen, kun Mehiläinen ja Meri-Lappi 
saapastelivat yli / K Tolkki 
16.11.2017c Rajoittamislain tiukennukset vaikuttavat Tervolan sote-ulkoistukseen / J Tiihonen 
16.11.2017d Tehyn uusi puheenjohtaja: Sotesta tulee vielä viides tuotantokausi / A Blencowe 
 
 
17.11.2017a Meri-Lapin sote-ulkoistus etenee – Länsi-Pohjan sairaanhoitopiirin hallitus teki 
hankintapäätöksen tiukalla äänestyksellä / J Mehtonen 
17.11.2017b Pitkään jatkunut vääntö Lapin sairaaloiden kesken johti lopulta yksityistämiseen – 
"Ei tämä minusta ole mikään kapina" / M Aula 
17.11.2017c Tervola hyväksyi yhteisyrityksen perustamisen – ulkoistuksen takana on nyt 
jokainen Meri-Lapin kunta / J Tiihonen 
20.11.2017 "Me emme hyväksy tällaista keskittämispolitiikkaa" – Meri-Lapin keskustapäättäjät 
ärsyyntyivät puolueen painostuksesta / K Vaara; J Mehtonen & M Aula 
21.11.2017a Länsi-Pohjan sote-ratkaisu aluehallintoviraston syyniin – Lapin kuntien kädet ovat 
sidotut / P Tuukkanen 
21.11.2017b Ministeriölähde: Länsi-Pohjan terveydenhoidon kallis ulkoistaminen veisi muun 
Lapin sote-rahat / M Stenroos 
23.11.2017 Meri-Lapin sote-ulkoistuksen hinta vain murto-osa Lapin kuluista – "Ei ole tarkoitus 
mennä kenenkään muun rahoille" / M Aula 
29.11.2017a Olisiko Lapilla mahdollisuus vielä löytää sote-sopu? Kansanedustaja patistaa kuntia 
palaamaan neuvottelupöytään / M Aula 
29.11.2017b Sote-neuvottelut Mehiläisen kanssa alkoivat –Tornion kaupunginjohtaja: 
Yhteisyritys säilyttää terveyskeskukset / J Tiihonen 
30.11.2017a Länskän psykiatriatalolle löytyi lopulta yhteinen tahtotila– "Kokouksessa ei 
tarvinnut edes äänestää" / J Tiihonen 
30.11.2017b Rovaniemi hakee yhä sotesopua Lappiin – yksi sairaala, kaksi toimipistettä / M 
Talvitie 
30.11.2017c Nousevatko asiakasmaksut? Kuinka pääsee hoitoon? – Selvitimme mitä Meri-Lapin 
sote-yhteisyritys tarkoittaisi potilaalle / J Mehtonen 
30.11.2017d Ministeriö suitsisi kuntien jättiulkoistuksia ennakoitua tiukemmin – Länsi-Pohja oli 
viimeinen pisara / H Tikkala 
1.12.2017 Lapin aluehallintovirasto antoi selvityksensä Meri-Lapin sote-yhteisyrityksestä – "Ei 
suuria huomioita, jotka olisivat yhteisyrityksestä sopimisen vastaisia" / J Mehtonen 
4.12.2017 Pihlajalinna on valittanut Meri-Lapin sote-kilpailutuksesta markkinaoikeuteen / J 
Mehtonen 
5.12.2017 Kemin vasemmisto äänesti Meri-Lapin sote-yrityksen sopimuskäsittelyn pöydälle – 
viivytystaistelu kiistetään / J Tiihonen 
11.12.2017a Uusi käänne Meri-Lapin sotessa: Kemin kaupunginhallitukselle esitetään 
epäluottamusta – asia sai taakseen kannatusta ja etenee / J Mehtonen 
11.12.2017b Kemin vasemmisto äänesti Meri-Lapin sote-yrityksen sopimuskäsittelyn pöydälle 
toistamiseen / J Mehtonen 
14.12.2017a Meri-Lapin sote-ulkoistus on muuttumassa kilpajuoksuksi – rajoituslaki etenee 
pikavauhtia / M Aula 
14.12.2017b Kemin päätös sote-yhteisyrityksestä pysyy – valtuusto ei pidä uutta kokousta 
maanantaina / J Mehtonen 
19.12.2017 Kemin kaupunginhallitus myönsi kaupunginjohtajalle luvan allekirjoittaa sote-
yhteisyrityksen sopimuspaperit / J Tiihonen & J Mehtonen 
22.12.2017a Miljardin sote-sopimus allekirjoitettiin Meri-Lapissa – keskussairaala ulkoistetaan 
15 vuodeksi / J Mehtonen & M Aula 
22.12.2017b Hallitukselta tyrmäys Lapin sote-haaveille – ei erillisratkaisua Meri-Lappiin / A 
Passoja 
 
